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A B S T R A C T   
Physical distancing has been an important policy to mitigate the spread of the novel coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) in public settings. However, the current 1–2 m physical distancing rule is based on the physics of 
droplet transport and could not directly translate into infection risk. We therefore revisit the 2-m physical 
distancing rule by developing an infection-risk-based model for human speaking. The key modeling framework 
components include viral load, droplets dispersion and evaporation, deposition efficiency, viral dose-response 
rate and infection risk. The results suggest that the one-size-fits-all 2-m physical distancing rule derived from 
the pure droplet-physics-based model is not applicable under some realistic indoor settings, and may rather 
increase transmission probability of diseases. Especially, in thermally stratified environments, the infection risk 
could exhibit multiple peaks for a long distance beyond 2 m. With Sobol’s sensitivity analysis, most variance of 
the risk is found to be significantly attributable to the variability in temperature gradient, exposure time and 
breathing height difference. Our study suggests there is no such magic 2 m physical distancing rule for all en-
vironments, but it needs to be used alongside other strategies, such as using face cover, reducing exposure time, 
and controlling the thermal stratification of indoor environment.   
1. Introduction 
The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has 
caused significant deaths and economic loss globally (WHO, 2020a). To 
contain and control the first and second waves of infection, non- 
pharmaceutical interventions have become the main strategies due to 
limited antiviral medications and absence of vaccines. Maintaining 
physical distancing has been considered to be effective at reducing 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus. The so-called ‘social distancing rules’ 
have been implemented in many countries in the on-going pandemic. 
World Health Organization (WHO) advises health care personnel and 
other staff to maintain a 3-foot (1-m) distance away from a person 
showing symptoms of respiratory disease (WHO, 2020b), which is fol-
lowed in countries like China, Denmark, France and Singapore (BBC, 
2020). The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) rec-
ommends a 6-foot (2-m) separation (CDC, 2020), as being seen in 
Canada, Spain and UK (Qian and Jiang, 2020). In other countries such as 
Australia and Germany (BBC, 2020; Qian and Jiang, 2020), a 1.5-m 
distancing rule is recommended in public places. The definition of 
1–2 m physical distancing can be traced back to many earlier studies 
(Wells, 1934; Turner et al., 1941), in which most of the exhaled droplets 
(>100 μm) was found to land within 1–2 m. However, the previous 
research now seems oversimplified from the following aspects: 
1) The droplets embedded in a cloud of exhaled airflow in fact 
contain those visible to the naked eye (millimeters), and invisible ones in 
the micron scale. Previous droplet dispersion observation work was 
insufficient to capture smaller droplets and the observation field was set 
at a few feet to the source (Wells, 1934; Turner et al., 1941). Those small 
droplets could easily travel long distances with exhaled jet or indoor 
airflow, and cause short- or long- range airborne transmission (Liu et al., 
2017a). Current social distancing rules for COVID-19 are based pri-
marily on the assumption that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted in large 
droplets only, but it has been understood that the aerosol transmission 
cannot be excluded and become much recognized recently (Anderson 
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et al., 2020; Morawska and Cao, 2020). 2) Coughing has been identified 
as the manifest symptom of respiratory diseases, such as influenza 
(Lindsley et al., 2010), SARS (Breugelmans et al., 2004), and the novel 
COVID-19 (Sohrabi et al., 2020), so research on the spread modes prior 
to the current pandemic has mainly focused on violent expiratory events 
like sneezing and coughing (Liu et al., 2017b; Wei and Li, 2015). Most 
recently, (Li et al., 2020a) suggested that 79% of the actual infected 
cases were infected by individuals with “mild, limited, or no symptoms”. 
Droplets generated from normal speaking by an asymptomatic infected 
person are increasingly considered to be responsible for infectious dis-
ease transmission, and may even lead to highly probable outbreak 
events (Buonanno et al., 2020; Stadnytskyi et al., 2020). It is of practical 
importance to clarify the physical distancing in view of speaking rather 
than coughing droplets, especially in public places where more asymp-
tomatic infected individuals may be present. 3) In most studies, indoor 
air is assumed to be well mixed. However, in the indoor space with 
displacement ventilation (DV) (Gil-Lopez et al., 2017), under-floor air 
distribution (UFAD) (Wang et al., 2011), and/or displacement nature 
ventilation (DNV) (Brandan, 2012), the air is likely not well mixed and a 
vertical thermal stratification exists, especially large enclosed space, e. 
g., airport terminals (Gil-Lopez et al., 2017) and a rebuilt Fangcang 
hospital (Liu et al., 2020b), among others. Previous studies found that 
the exhaled small droplets and droplet nuclei could be locked up at 
people’s breathing zone by the thermal stratification, and travel a long 
distance along the exhalation direction, increasing the range of cross 
infection (Qian et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2019). This suggests that the 
physical distancing in indoor environments could be complicated by its 
airflow and temperature distribution. 4) Owing to the directionality of 
exhaled airflow, the relative postures of infected and exposed in-
dividuals are important factors in determining cross-infection risk (Bjørn 
and Nielsen, 2002; Liu et al., 2019), such as seated and standing pas-
sengers in public vehicles, standing doctors and seated or bed-lying 
patients in hospital wards, and children and adults in public places. In 
this connection, the relative postures influence the individual’s exposure 
to the exhaled aerosols generated by the infector. 5) The current 
definition of physical distancing only looks at how far respiratory -
droplets of different sizes could travel physically, but does not represent 
the exposure to virus-laden droplets nor the infection risk of the sus-
ceptible individuals. The disease transmission is a combined action of 
respiratory droplets transport, viral kinetics and dose-response effects. 
The current recommended physical distancing of 3–6 feet (1–2 m) is 
mostly based on droplet transport physics, but somehow does not 
address the potential exposure and risk estimation, possibly generating 
an underappreciated potential infection risk for the susceptible 
individuals. 
Due to the complication of the transmission risk of infectious disease, 
the distancing rules need to take account of multiple factors including 
viral load, indoor ventilation, expiratory airflow and viral dose-response 
rate. In this study, an infection-risk-based model is used to quantify the 
relationship between infection risk and physical distancing within a 
short distance range. The key processes in the model include viral ki-
netics, droplet dispersion and transformation with exhalation air and 
deposition in respiratory system. The infection risk is assessed using the 
dose-response models for viruses. The infection risk by aerosol trans-
mission during speaking is quantified under various scenarios, i.e., with 
or without thermal stratification, commonly seen relative postures of 
infected and exposed individuals in public places and exposure time. 
The infection risks due to close contact (direct/indirect) and large res-
piratory droplets by coughs or sneezes or droplets of saliva are not 
included in this study. 
2. Methods 
The goal here is to establish a risk-based physical distancing assess-
ment model between the infected and susceptible individuals, which 
necessitates consideration of five stages of transmission and infection, 
shown in Fig. 1. Virus-laden droplets are exhaled from an infected 
person with a viral load (i.e., the number concentration of pathogens in 
the droplets). The exhaled droplets then disperse and evaporate in the 
combined background of the exhaled air and ambient air. Some of the 
Fig. 1. A schematic view of the transmission risk induced by inhalation of small droplets and droplet nuclei between the infected person and the susceptible person. 
In a thermally-stratified indoor environment, the ambient air density ρa decreases with the height y. HA (head airway regions), TB (tracheobronchial regions) and AL 
(alveolar regions). The physical distancing refers to the distance between two human mouths. 
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droplets or their residuals (droplet nuclei) in air are inhaled by the 
exposed person and deposit in the respiratory system, and finally induce 
infection according to the viral dose-response rate. 
2.1. Viral load in exhaled droplets 
The number (Np) and size distribution (dp) of expelled droplets 
generated from speaking are obtained from (Duguid, 1946), which is 
still widely adopted today in understanding dynamics of airborne vi-
ruses or transmission model and has been repeated and confirmed by 
other more recent studies using modern aerosol characterization 
equipment (Yang et al., 2007; Chao et al., 2009). In this work, the viral 
load (nppath) of three viruses, i.e., the influenza A virus (IAV), SARS-CoV-1 
and HCoV-229E are located from the published literature (Gao et al., 
2020; Lim et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2008). The number of pathogens 
in any given expiratory droplet is therefore determined by the pathogen 
concentration, i.e., V0nppath, where V0 =
1
6 πdp
3 is the initial volume of 
each droplet upon exhalation. Although the droplet size varies due to 
evaporation, the pathogens themselves are assumed to be nonvolatile, 
and the number of pathogens in any droplet is assumed to be constant. 
The concentration of pathogens per unit volume of air is 
Cpath = CpV0nppath, where Cp is the local concentration of expiratory 
droplets per unit volume of air. 
2.2. Droplet transport and transformation 
The airflow generated by speaking is assumed to be a turbulent 
round jet oriented in the x-direction, as shown in Fig. 1. The state pa-
rameters on the cross-sectional plane of the expiratory jet are assumed to 
follow the Gaussian profiles (see Supplementary Eqs. (S1)-(S4)). The 
total fluxes of volume, momentum, buoyancy and excess state parame-
ters in the turbulent jet flow are obtained through cross-sectional in-
tegrations over the jet profiles, in which the buoyancy flux is dependent 
on a stable density distribution of ambient air ρa (y) in a stratified 
environment, which is determined by the temperature gradient in the 
vertical y-direction (Fig. 1). An integral model is formulated for the 
conservation equations for the flux quantities using an entrainment 
closure approach, and the state parameters of the jet flow can be ob-
tained, as detailed by (Liu et al., 2019). According to (Duguid, 1946), the 
speaking-generated droplet size ranges from 0.3 to 1000 μm, with a 
large proportion of droplets smaller than 40 μm. (Wei and Li, 2015) and 
(Liu et al., 2020a) showed that droplets of < 50 µm can disperse closely 
following the exhaled airflow after being expelled. This result led to the 
conclusion that the short-range airborne route dominates the trans-
mission in close contact with an infected person while speaking, in 
which case the droplet number concentration Cp during the transport 
process can be directly obtained using the above jet integral model. The 
detailed mathematical derivation for each stage of transmission and 
infection is provided in the Supplementary Material. 
Exhaled droplets will evaporate and become droplet nuclei while 
dispersing with the jet flow. The size of the droplet nucleus is a function 
of the initial size of the droplet, its components, RH and ambient tem-
perature distribution (Liu et al., 2017b). Based on existing models for the 
exhaled droplet motion and mass and heat transfer (Wei and Li, 2015), 
the size variation with distancing and time of the speaking-generated 
droplets (<40 μm) can be obtained (see Supplementary Fig. S3). It 
shows that the speaking-generated droplets can evaporate totally at a 
short distance (<0.4 m) within 0.2 s, and the residual droplet nuclei 
continues to travel longer distances with the airflow in indoor envi-
ronments and finally be inhaled by exposed person. 
2.3. Inhalation and deposition in respiratory system 
To determine the particle concentrations that are actually inhaled by 
the susceptible person, a breathing rate B is assumed to be constant 
throughout the transmission process. The deposition efficiency depends 
on the particle size and the region of the airway where deposition occurs 
(Hinds, 1999). In general, large droplets deposit in nasopharyngeal area, 
while small ones can reach the conducting airways and alveolar. Studies 
on airborne transmission indicated that infections via aerosols were 
most likely to originate in the lower respiratory tract, specifically the 
alveoli (Nicas et al., 2005). Furthermore, medical studies show that 
respiratory disease viruses present a clinicopathological difference in 
the distribution in human airways. For example, common human- 
derived viruses (such as HCoV-229E) are found to bound extensively 
to epithelial cells in the bronchi and, to a lesser degree, to alveolar cells 
(Shinya et al., 2006); by contrast, IAV and SARS-CoV-1 bound exten-
sively to alveolar cells (Shinya et al., 2006; Gu and Korteweg, 2007). 
Because the site of airborne infection is not absolutely clear, the total 
deposition rate (η) of inhaled particles in HA, TB and AL regions is 
considered here, and calculated using the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection model (Hinds, 1999) (see Supplementary 
Fig. S4). Therefore, the number of pathogens (̂I¼dp ) deposited in the 
respiratory system induced by the droplet of initial diameter dp during 
an exposure time interval t is related to the local airborne concentration 
of pathogens as Î¼dp = Cpath,dp Î⋅Bt. Since the risk of infection by 
pathogen-laden particles is a combination of the probabilities that one or 
more particles from the different diameter ranges contact a mucous 
membrane and causes infection, the ultimate number of deposited 
pathogens is ̂I¼ =
∑40
dp=1Î¼dp . 
2.4. Viral dose-response rate 
Deposition of virus-laden droplets in the respiratory tract does not 
always result in infection, since the mucus layer could provide some 
level of protection against virus invasion and subsequent infection. The 
dose-response relation is utilized here to assess the infection risk as a 
function of the exposure dose (̂I¼total). The model providing the best fit 
to the infectious dose data on the disease should be selected for infection 
risk assessment. Considering the current unavailable information on 
SARS-CoV-2 when conducting this study, we chose to reference the dose- 
response models for IAV, SARS-CoV-1 and HCoV-229E from existing 
studies. 
2.5. People-to-people postures 
Six scenarios for common person-to-person postures in public places, 
such as hospital ward, waiting room, public transportations and other 
environments are summarized in Fig. 2. The breathing heights are 1.75 
m, 1.18 m and 0.8 m for standing, seated and lying person, respectively. 
Other key modelling parameters are listed in Supplementary Table S1. 
2.6. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis of the infection-risk-based model is undertaken 
for two type of relative postures in the stratified environment: 1) same 
breathing heights between two individuals (Scenarios a, b and d); 2) 
different breathing heights (Scenarios c, e and f). The major input pa-
rameters considered in the sensitivity study include: (i) viral load, ndroppath , 
(ii) exposure time, t, (iii) temperature gradient, dT/dy, (iv) ambient 
temperature, Ta, (v) relative humidity, RH, and (vi) breathing rate, B. A 
total of 6,000 Latin-hypercube samples from the 6 parameter distribu-
tions (see Supplementary Table S2) are generated and the parameter 
variability are propagated through Monte Carlo simulations of the 
model in non-uniform indoor environments. Sobol’s variance-based 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to quantitatively attribute the vari-
ance of the infection risk to the uncertainties or variabilities of different 
input parameters (Sobol, 2001). 
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3. Results 
3.1. Influential factors for distribution of transmission probability 
The distributions of infection risk on three cross planes (i.e., planes 
xy, xz and yz in Fig. 1) are calculated to investigate the influences of 
exposure time (5 min and 30 min) of the susceptible individual and 
indoor temperature distribution (dT/dy = 0 and dT/dy = 2 ◦C/m). The 
virus-laden droplets are exhaled from a standing infector, transport in 
air and reach the standing susceptible person. Representative contour 
plots of the transmission probability of IAV as a function of relative 
distance are presented in Fig. 3. It shows that in each case there is a high 
transmission probability near the infected person (i.e., near x, y, z = 0, 
1.75 m, 0), with the probability decaying at larger distances and greater 
Fig. 2. Scenarios of relative postures of infected and susceptible individuals: a- standing to standing, b-seated to seated, c-seated to standing, d-lying to lying, e-lying 
to seated, and f-lying to standing. The infector is green, and the susceptible person is yellow. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 3. Contour plots of transmission probability of IAV: (a) uniform environment (dT/dy = 0), exposure time of 5 min; (b) uniform environment (dT/dy = 0), 
exposure time of 30 min; (c) stratified environment (dT/dy = 2 ◦C/m), exposure time of 30 min. Red denotes high probability and blue denotes low probability. 
Planes xy (z = 0), xz (y = 1.75 m), and yz (x = 2 m) are donated in Fig. 1. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to 
the web version of this article.) 
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heights. The exact shape of the ‘airborne infectious zone’ depends on 
both the exposure time and the temperature distribution of indoor air. 
With a longer exposure time, the infection risk becomes higher for 
the susceptible individual at the same exposure distance. In specific, as 
shown in the contours on yz planes at a relative distance of 2 m to the 
infector, the infection risk is close to be 0.6 when the susceptible person 
is exposed for 30 min, but only a risk of 0.3 for 5 min exposure. However, 
it is observed from the contours on xz planes of Fig. 3 (a) and (b) that at 
the breathing height (1.75 m) the transmission probability can decay to 
0 within 2 m, unaffected by the exposure time. It suggests that the 
exposure time has an impact on the infection risk, but less affecting the 
transmission distance. However, in a non-uniform environment with a 
thermal stratification, as shown in Fig. 3 (c), the transmission proba-
bility with the distance gets a little complicated. The infection risk 
cannot keep decaying along the vertical height, but varying along the 
exhalation direction for a long distance, further than 2 m. It is more 
obvious to see from the contours on the xz plane that the infection risk 
firstly decreases to 0 within 2 m, but increasing again within 3.5–5 m 
due to the oscillation shape of the “infection zone” on the xy plane, i.e., 
under this setting, even 2 m may be too close. 
3.2. Physical distancing and infection risk for two standing persons 
The infection risk with distancing under Scenario a is presented in 
Fig. 4. To make a comparison with the current distancing rules recom-
mended by CDC, ambient air temperature distribution is not considered 
in Fig. 4 (a). It shows that the infection risk of all three viruses to an 
exposed person decreases monotonously with distancing, and ap-
proaches approx. 0.0001 at about 2 m, coincident with the 1–2 m 
physical distancing rule. However, when indoor airflow is characterized 
with a vertical temperature gradient, as shown in Fig. 4 (b), there is a 
first decrease of the infection risk within 2 m, but a second-high level 
rather than continuously decreasing at a distance larger than 2 m. 
Therefore, it seems that the current distancing rules are only applicable 
for the simplest airborne transmission case where the relative postures 
and ambient temperature distribution are ignored. 
3.3. Impact of different relative postures on infection risk 
The infection risk of IAV is examined under six scenarios in Fig. 2. 
The calculations are conducted in the indoor environment with a tem-
perature gradient of dT/dy = 2 ◦C/m, with the results in a uniform 
environment included here for comparisons. 
The results in a well-mixed indoor environment are shown in Fig. 5 
(a). The infection risk curves overlap perfectly when the infected and 
exposed persons are at the same breathing height (i.e., Scenarios a, b and 
d). Under these conditions, the infection risk shows a monotonic 
decrease with the distancing in a uniform environment, so the 2-m 
distancing rule is still effective here. However, when there is a breath-
ing height difference between the individuals (i.e., Scenarios c, e and f, 
with the difference of 0.57 m, 0.38 m and 0.95 m, respectively), the 
infection risk shows parabolic trend with the distancing, that means, the 
exposed person could be more susceptible at a certain distance to the 
source, such as approx. 2 m under Scenarios c and e, or even 2.5 m under 
Scenario f. Therefore, this is a situation where relative posture become 
an important parameter, and the 2-m distancing could become a 
dangerous threshold with a high transmission probability for the sus-
ceptible people. 
When the temperature is non-uniformly distributed indoors, as 
shown in Fig. 5 (b), the infection risk curves also overlap exactly under 
the Scenarios a, b and d. However, things get a little complicated because 
there is a clear rebound within 3–4 m, and then the infection risk re-
mains at a high level with oscillations for a long distance. What is worse, 
the existence of the breathing height difference (i.e., Scenarios c, e and f) 
makes the risk peak at much closer distances to the infector. It suggests 
that in the poorly ventilated places, the infection risk may become very 
high at or after 2 m rather than show a simple decrease tend with 
distancing. It is highly likely that the disease infection happens within a 
long distance to the source patient, up to several meters or room scales. 
3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
We obtain 11 social distancing bins at 0.5 m interval for up to 6 m 
distance. Considerable variability of infection risk has been observed 
spanning 11 social distancing bins in relation to simultaneous variation 
of the 6 input parameters. Fig. 6 shows the results under Scenarios a, b 
and d (same breathing heights, Fig. 6a), and Scenario e (with a breathing 
height difference of 0.38 m, Fig. 6b). The results under Scenarios c and f 
are shown in Supplementary Fig. S6. Overall, the simulated infection 
risk has a left-tail distribution for all scenarios. The variability of the 
transmission probability is more significant when there is a breathing 
height difference between exposed and infected people. In specific, the 
highest probability ranges within 0.86–0.95 after 1.5 m distancing in 
Figure (b), while only 0.22–0.82 after 3 m distancing in Fig. 6 (a). It 
implies a breathing height difference could make the susceptible person 
more likely to get infected after a 3 m distancing. However, the lowest 
Fig. 4. Quantified infection-risk-based physical distancing of two standing persons, with different exposure time in parentheses of the legend: (a) uniform envi-
ronment (dT/dy = 0); (b) stratified environment (dT/dy = 2 ◦C/m). 
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transmission probability invariably occurs at 2–3 m distancing for the 
same breathing heights in Fig. 6(a) and 0.5–1 m distancing for the case 
of breathing height difference in Fig. 6(b), respectively, which is less 
sensitive to the changes of variables. 
Results of Sobol’s analyses (see Supplementary Tables S3-S6) show 
the 6 input parameters contribute to the risk differently at various social 
distances, where the main effect Si indicates the proportion of output 
uncertainty removed by fixed parameter Xi. Of all 6 input parameters, 
RH (Si = 0) is the least significant for the infection risk, since the 
speaking-generated droplets (<40 μm) evaporate quickly into droplet 
nuclei within a short time of 0.2 s and a short distance of 0.4 m from the 
infector (see Supplementary Fig. S3), being hardly affected by RH. The 
results are also consistent with the recent findings of (Liu et al., 2020a), 
i.e., RH has more impact on medium droplets, while almost unaffecting 
small droplets of < 40 μm and their residuals. The largest Si is deter-
mined as temperature gradient and exposure time. At 2.5–4.5 m 
distancing to the infector, thermal stratification is the most important 
contributor (accounting for approx. 45.7%-88.8%) to the variance in the 
infection risk, especially under Scenarios a, b, d and e with a small 
breathing height difference. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to 
take into account of indoor thermal stratification to get full picture of 
infection risk in indoor environment when the distance between people 
is within 2.5–4.5 m. At other distances, especially at 0.5–2.5 m, exposure 
time is considerably significant, whose Si can reach 86.2%. It means that 
in close proximity to the source infector, reducing the exposure time is 
more crucial to minimize the risk comparing with other interventions. 
The viral load, ambient air temperature and breathing rate are relatively 
less influential to the variability of the transmission probability within 
the range evaluated. 
4. Discussion 
Most existing droplet transport models for defining the physical 
distancing have not recognized the complexity of the transport process 
of expired droplets or droplet nuclei, and the resulting exposure and 
infection risk. Our model attempts to relax some of the assumptions in 
the existing models and incorporate the infection risk estimation. After a 
sensitivity analysis of the model, we found that the infection risk is 
significantly affected by indoor environmental conditions, relative 
postures and exposure time. The one-size-fits-all 2-m physical distancing 
rule seems not applicable in some realistic settings. 
Fig. 5. Risk-based physical distancing under different relative postures of the infected and susceptible people (with exposure time of 30 min): (a) uniform envi-
ronment (dT/dy = 0); (b) stratified environment (dT/dy = 2 ◦C/m). Lines of Scenarios a, b and d overlap exactly in two figures. 
Fig. 6. Box plots of infection risk: (a) without breathing height difference (Scenarios a, b and d); (b) with a breathing height difference of 0.38 m (Scenario e). The 
box indicates 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles. The lower whisker shows the minimum and the upper whisker shows the maximum. Mean values are indicated by the 
diamonds (◆). Results under Scenarios c and f can be found in Supplementary Fig. S6. 
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4.1. Droplet-physics-based versus infection-risk-based physical distancing 
Traditionally, the 1–2-m rule of spatial separation based on droplet 
transport physics in isolation was central to infection precautions and 
assumed that large droplets did not travel further than 2 m. In the recent 
Lancet review, (Chu et al., 2020) analyzed 29 studies on droplet spread 
of actual case and model predictions, and suggested that the physical 
distancing of 1–2 m may be probably associated with a reduction in 
infection. The finding is consistent with the droplet-physics based 
model, and has been used to define exposure to the SARS-CoV-2 in the 
earlier studies when the virus was thought to be spread by ‘contact and 
droplet’ transmission only (WHO, 2020b; CDC, 2020). However, some 
other studies that considered the possible close-range airborne trans-
mission route via small droplets do not actually support the 1–2-m rule 
of spatial separation. For example, (Xie et al., 2007) revisited the Wells’ 
work and found that droplets of <50 µm can travel more than 6 m for 
sneezing with an exhalation velocity of 50 m/s and more than 2 m for 
coughing at a velocity of 10 m/s. (Wei and Li, 2015) employed the 
discrete random walk model for particle tracking and found small 
droplets (<50 µm) can follow the coughing airflow easily, dispersing in 
the whole jet region to 4 m. Subsequently, (Ji et al., 2018) further 
emphasized that the small droplets can disperse with the exhaled jet 
flow to a long distance by numerical simulations, which cannot be 
neglected in accessing the infection risk within a close-range contact of 
people. In most of these studies prior to the current pandemic, the vio-
lent respiratory events like sneezing and coughing are the focus only 
because they are recognized as the manifest symptoms of respiratory 
diseases. With increasing evidence that the droplets from an asymp-
tomatic individual while speaking is a likely mode of disease trans-
mission, dispersion of speaking-generated droplets begins to get 
attention. That means, the disease transmission cannot neatly be sepa-
rated into the dichotomy of droplet versus airborne transmission routes 
based on an overly simplified model. Most recently, (Jones et al., 2020) 
reviewed the evidence of the 2-m physical distancing and agreed with 
our study that the final infection risk of an exposed person is determined 
by multiple factors, rather than being reflected by the single and fixed 
physical distancing rules based only on droplet physics. 
Our results suggest that a unified distancing rule of 1–2 m is not 
always an effective guidance of spatial separation in different epidemics, 
but rather may underestimate the infection risk to exposed people. In 
addition, prior droplet-physics based physical distancing mainly focused 
on the infected person, without considering the exposure time of the 
susceptible people. However, the Sobol’s analysis indicates that a pro-
longed exposure time could significantly increase the risk to a high level 
at a close distancing to the infection source, which can probably be 
linked to some clusters of cases in the outbreak of COVID-19. For 
example, a two-and-a-half-hour choir rehearsal with one symptomatic 
person led to 32 confirmed and 20 probable COVID-19 cases among the 
61 singers (Hamner et al., 2020; Miller et al., 2020); a cross-infection 
occurred in a Chinese restaurant among three non-associated families 
at neighboring tables during the lunch, and all the three families occu-
pied the restaurants for more than one hour, without no evidence of 
direct or indirect contact according to the video record (Li et al., 2020b). 
Thus, it appears that for the exposed people, keeping the 1–2 m physical 
distancing alone may be not enough to mitigate transmission at some 
conditions. 
4.2. Well-mixed versus thermally-stratified indoor environment 
We found that the infection risk in indoor environment is about three 
orders of magnitude larger than that in outdoor space with natural wind. 
(Zhang et al., 2020) evaluated the aerosol transmission risk for COVID- 
19 from South China Seafood Market to surrounding buildings and 
found that the outdoor infection risk by aerosol transmission rapidly 
decreased due to the strong dilution by the ambient air. Different from 
outdoor environment with sufficient wind dilution capacity, our results 
suggest that the indoor infection risk variability with the distancing is 
greatly affected by the indoor thermal stratification, especially at 
2.5–4.5 m (Tables S3–S6). In a well-mixed room, the infection proba-
bility decreases to an acceptable risk (<0.0001) after 2 m, regardless of 
the exposure time and viral load. In this case, a physical distancing of 
>2 m may be effective to lower the infection risk. However, when 
considering the thermal stratification indoors (e.g., with DV, UFAD, 
DNV systems), the infection risk shows multiple peaks with distancing. It 
is because the exhaled airflow can be easily trapped at a lock-up layer by 
indoor thermal stratification and travel a long distance with some os-
cillations, i.e., the lock-up phenomenon reported in references (Qian 
et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2019). The airborne droplets and droplet nuclei 
carried by the airflow can finally accumulate at the lock-up layer, 
causing a high infection risk to the susceptible people. The physical 
distancing rule seems to be ineffective in such indoor environments. Our 
infection risk-based model also supports the early recommendation that 
DV should not be used in hospital environments to avoid cross infection 
(Qian et al., 2006). In addition, ventilation designers need to be careful 
with the thermal stratification in critical environments, such as the 
emergency Fangcang hospitals converted from gymnasiums or con-
vention centers in the pandemic, where a thermal stratification could 
prevail. It should take special care to design an appropriate indoor 
environment or to modify existing ventilation patterns with respect to 
control of airborne transmission of diseases. 
4.3. The importance of relative posture on infection risk 
The importance of relative posture of individuals on personal expo-
sure to exhaled aerosols has been mentioned in previous studies (Liu 
et al., 2019; Bjørn and Nielsen, 2002), but no further studies quantifying 
its relationship with infection risk. In our model, six commonly-observed 
relative posture scenarios based on human regular activities in real 
world are discussed (Fig. 2). The estimations of infection risk suggest 
that for two persons with the same breathing heights (e.g., standing-to- 
standing people talking to each other, seated-to-seated people in public 
transportations or waiting rooms, and lying-to-lying patients in hospital 
wards), a 2-m physical distancing rule could effectively reduce the 
infection risk when the indoor air is well mixed. However, the existing of 
a breathing height difference could make the exposed person riskier at 
1.5–3-m distancing. For example, for a lying patient and a seated visitor, 
the infection risk could peak at approx. 2 m, while for a seated/lying 
patient and a standing healthcare worker in hospital wards, or seated-to- 
standing people in public transportations or waiting rooms, the infection 
risk could peak at a further distance of approx. 3 m. This is related to the 
directionality of the non-isothermal exhaled airflow to be upward and 
forward, causing the susceptible person with a higher breathing height 
to be easily exposed at a further distance. The findings are consistent 
with the observations of (Bjørn and Nielsen, 2002). In their full-scale 
experiments, the exposure concentration of the exposed manikin 
decreased with distance for standing-to-standing situation, while there 
was a higher exposure within a short distance in the case with a seated 
source manikin and a standing exposed manikin. In addition, our results 
suggest that the condition could be even worse in stratified environ-
ments, i.e., there is a continuously high level with multiple peaks of the 
infection risk regardless of distancing. (Liu et al. 2019) predicted the 
exposed concentration of susceptible people in hospital wards with 
thermal stratification, and found that the breathing height difference 
could make people more easily exposed to a high concentration within a 
long distance. The infection-risk-based model provide a further valida-
tion on the importance of relative postures in view of the infection risk. 
It suggests that special attentions should be given by the susceptible 
people who have relatively high breathing heights in an enclosed 
environment, e.g., the health care workers and visitors standing next to 
the lying/seated patients in hospital and the standing passengers relative 
to the seated passengers in public transportations. 
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4.4. Implication to the COVID-19 transmission 
This study looks specifically at the physical distancing in relation to 
the transmission risk via speaking-generated airborne aerosols. The 
model developed here includes some major stages of infectious disease 
transmission, and considers the important roles of the exhalation and 
indoor environments under the various relative posture conditions, and 
is applicable to different airborne diseases carried by expiratory drop-
lets. We focused on three key viruses, i.e., IAV, SARS-CoV-1 and HCoV- 
229E, because the key data of these three viruses such as viral load and 
dose-response models are available and have been used in other 
modeling studies (Watanabe et al., 2010; Halloran et al., 2012; Gao 
et al., 2020). Many viral kinetics of SARS-CoV-2 are now emerging (Ma 
et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2021), the theoretical framework can therefore 
be extended to COVID-19 when the dose-response relation of SARS-CoV- 
2 becomes available. The infection risk due to close contact (direct/in-
direct) and large respiratory droplets by coughs or sneezes or droplets of 
saliva is not included in this study. In addition, COVID-19 transmission 
from asymptomatic hosts makes it critical that we develop the infection- 
risk-based model in view of normal speaking instead of sneezing or 
coughing. This work suggests that physical distancing rules at a specific 
distance of 1–2 m may not work in some realistic settings. Other stra-
tegies, such as good personal protection such as mask wearing and better 
building ventilation should be carried out along with the physical 
distancing rule. 
Distancing is important when it is linked to decreased incidence of 
respiratory infectious disease (Alagoz et al., 2020; Du et al., 2020), 
especially via the close contact transmission. We particularly look at the 
short-range airborne route, and the resultant infectious dose and finally 
infection risk considering the corresponding dose-response relationship 
per virus. Although it is well recognized that more distance is better to 
reduce overall infection risk, there is debate on what is the safe distance 
threshold to make an effective use of indoor space (Wong et al., 2004; 
Chu et al., 2020; Tang et al., 2021). This is particularly useful infor-
mation when considering the reopening strategies for various buildings 
after the pandemic. We hope to provide some useful evidence-based 
guidelines for determining such safe distance threshold. 
The limitations include several assumptions built in the model e.g., 
the consideration of a steady state expired jet, the fixed position and 
gesture/posture of the two people in space, as well as the non- 
consideration of thermal plume around the human body and the 
breathing synchronization of the two people. 
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